Afghan Veterans and Other Matters

The birth of the veterans' movement

The veterans' movement of Afghan War soldiers in the USSR began long before the war ended. The first organization was founded in November 1984 at the Ukhta Industrial Institute (Komi ASSR) by student Alexander Pasechnik together with former fellow paratroopers. This was the Council of Internationalist Soldiers, which became the first association of its kind not only in the republic but in the entire Soviet Union.

Life itself pushed people toward founding the organization. Servicemen returning from Afghanistan encountered complete state indifference to their problems. They had fought, had paid their debt to the country, but couldn't get any help solving pressing issues – treatment, rehabilitation, social readjustment. In response to requests for help, Soviet officials would reply with a phrase that became infamously well-known: "I didn't send you to Afghanistan!" or "We didn't send you there!"

Alongside Ukhta, in the mid-to-late 1980s, clubs, associations, societies, and local public organizations of Afghan veterans began springing up in Orenburg, Tver, Novosibirsk, and other cities. In 1987 in Nefteyugansk, demobilized internationalist soldiers, under the city Komsomol committee, founded the city reservists' club "Patriot." The main task of such associations was to help, assist, and support soldiers returning from Afghanistan.

The creation of a union-wide organization

On March 13, 1989, a month after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, work began in Moscow on creating a unified USSR Union of Afghan Veterans. A group of enthusiasts, people who cared about the problems of internationalist soldiers, began meeting in premises provided by the editorial department of the Moscow Patriarchate – two small rooms in a building slated for demolition.

The first funding was modest and came from the participants' own savings: Metropolitan Pitirim contributed 25,000 rubles, academician Ryzhov – 20,000, and A. Kotenev, the first chairman of the USSR Union of Afghan Veterans – 10,000.

The founding congress of the unified association of internationalist soldiers was held in February 1990 at the M. V. Frunze Central House of the Soviet Army in Moscow. The USSR Ministry of Defense provided important assistance in organizing the congress. Public institutions also lent support, in particular the Russian Orthodox Church, in the person of Metropolitan Pitirim of Volokolamsk and Yuryev.

At the Founding Congress, the most important areas of the Union's social and patriotic work were defined:

• Aid to disabled war veterans
• Support for the families of the fallen
• Patriotic education work with young people
• Commemorating the memory of internationalist soldiers who gave their lives fulfilling their military and internationalist duty

On November 17-18, 1990, at the Palace of Culture of the "Prozhektor" factory, at 1st Vladimirskaya Street, building 10, the Founding Congress of Afghan Veterans of Russia was held, creating the Union of Afghan Veterans of the RSFSR. Registration was formalized by Resolution No. 532 of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR dated November 20, 1990, "On the Activity of the Russian Union of Afghan Veterans." This date is considered the birthday of the Russian Union of Afghan Veterans (RSVA).

"Those who went through Afghanistan twice"

Soldiers of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (OKSVA), on returning from Afghanistan, faced not only material hardship but also a deep psychological conflict. To the phrase "We didn't send you to Afghanistan," some servicemen would reply: "I'm ready to walk back to my Afghanistan on foot – I've had enough of your fake, dishonest, and mercenary civilian world."

The main reason soldiers wanted to return to the Afghan war was, in their view, "the absence in civilian life of the honesty, sincerity, and purity of human relations characteristic of a combat environment, where there was clear-cut directness and no duplicity."

In civilian life, Afghan War veterans experienced sharp conflict with society: the veterans' pattern of relationships did not fit into ordinary social life. Afghan veterans often could not accept the rules of peacetime. Many preferred the hardship and deprivation of combat to a return to the measured, tedious service of a peacetime garrison. Some officers actively sought to be sent back to war.

Young men who had been through the horrors of war and had absorbed the spirit of combat brotherhood reacted painfully to the slightest sign of injustice in civilian life. This often spilled over into conflicts, including at home. In critical situations, family members would turn straight to members of Afghan veteran associations – they could calm down an enraged comrade far faster and more effectively than the police.

The criminalization of the Afghan movement

Social preconditions

The collapse of the USSR and the socio-economic crisis of the early 1990s became a catalyst for the criminalization of part of the Afghan veterans' movement. Veterans possessed several qualities that made them attractive to the criminal world:

• Combat experience and military training
• Psychological readiness to use violence
• Teamwork skills and a clear hierarchy
• Combat brotherhood and mutual support
• Disillusionment with the state and society
• No prospects for legal employment

Many Afghan veterans, having failed to adapt to peacetime life and never receiving the state support they'd been promised, found themselves on the margins of life. Some of them found a use for their skills in organized crime. Afghan veterans were used as:

• Enforcers and hitmen for criminal groups
• Guards for commercial enterprises
• Participants in "showdowns" and debt collection
• Bodyguards for crime bosses

Afghan OCGs

In a number of Russian regions, entire organized criminal groups formed, consisting predominantly of Afghan War veterans. These organized crime groups were notable for their high discipline, organization, and cruelty. They controlled various sectors of the shadow economy:

• Racketeering (running protection rackets over commercial businesses, kiosks, markets)
• Control over the gambling business
• Illegal arms trafficking
• Participation in the redistribution of property
• Security services

Eduard Abdullin, a judge of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan, recalled representatives of the Afghan movement actually backing certain crime bosses. One example was Igor Kusk, an Afghan War veteran who was chairman of the union of Afghan war veterans in Nizhnekamsk, while at the same time combining this social activity with criminal activity. A great many Afghan veterans came to his trial – the courtroom was packed. All of these spectators were on the defendant's side.

Such cases were not isolated. In various regions of the country, Afghan organizations sometimes became a cover for criminal activity, and combat brotherhood was used to create a tight, hard-to-penetrate structure.

The Russian Fund for Disabled Veterans of the Afghan War

Creation and privileges

The Russian Fund for Disabled Veterans of the Afghan War (RFIVA) was founded in 1991 and received significant state financial support. However, budget funds proved insufficient for the needs of disabled Afghan veterans, so the country's leadership allowed the Fund to engage in business activity, including foreign trade.

The organization received unprecedented customs preferences and export quotas for moving goods. These privileges included:

• Exemption from customs duties
• Minimal tax payments or full exemption from them
• A simplified customs clearance procedure
• The right to import and export a wide range of goods

Thanks to these privileges, a whole array of commercial structures sprang up around the Fund. Privileges meant to help disabled veterans came to be used for extracting profit. Fly-by-night firms and shell companies appeared, simply enriching themselves off the preferences granted by the state, while the money often never reached the veterans themselves.

How the charitable foundations' scheme worked

A typical scheme for such a fund in the early 1990s worked as follows:

1. The fund obtained official registration as a charitable organization for helping veterans
2. Through connections in state structures (often through Afghan veterans themselves who held posts in the security services), the fund secured customs privileges and tax exemption
3. The fund began importing consumer goods (cigarettes, alcohol, electronics, cars) without paying duties
4. The goods were sold on the domestic market at market prices, with the difference between the preferential purchase and the sale generating enormous profit
5. Part of the profit went as kickbacks to "the right guys in uniform" – customs officers, Interior Ministry staff, prosecutors, who ensured the scheme's protection
6. A small share of the funds was genuinely directed toward helping veterans (for the sake of the paperwork)
7. The bulk of the profit ended up in the pockets of the fund's leadership and their partners

Customs authorities were forced to "look the other way" – to turn a blind eye to such activity, since fiscal audits of the funds were forbidden "from above." Any attempt to audit a fund was immediately shut down by a phone call from high offices.

The struggle for control

Naturally, disputes arose around an organization with such a financial stream, over the legitimacy of how the Fund's income was being used. Inside the association itself, a fierce struggle broke out over leadership positions and control of the cash flows.

In the conditions of the 1990s, such corporate conflicts were resolved mainly by radical methods. The rival factions inside the Fund used every means available: from administrative pressure to the direct physical elimination of competitors.

The tragedy at Kotlyakovskoye Cemetery

The outcome of this internal struggle was the tragedy at Kotlyakovskoye Cemetery on November 10, 1996. An explosion killed 14 people, including leaders of RFIVA, and wounded another 30. It was one of the most notorious crimes of the mid-1990s.

The explosion occurred during the funeral of one of the leaders of the Afghan movement. A powerful explosive device had been planted in the grave in advance and detonated at the moment of the final farewell. Among the dead were not only leaders of the Fund but also rank-and-file veterans who had come to see off a comrade on his last journey.

This crime became a symbol of how deeply crime had penetrated the veterans' structures. The criminal intrusion hit the prestige of the entire Afghan movement hard. Public opinion, which up to then had been largely on the veterans' side, began to shift.

The RSVA-RFIVA standoff

After the tragedy at Kotlyakovskoye Cemetery, the Russian Union of Afghan Veterans began actively obstructing the Fund for Disabled Veterans' further activity. The RSVA, which positioned itself as a "clean" public organization, sought to distance itself from RFIVA's criminal baggage.

The standoff between the two organizations continued for more than two decades. The RSVA sought to have RFIVA stripped of state support and privileges, pointing to the misuse of funds and ties to organized crime. The Fund for Disabled Veterans, in turn, accused the RSVA of envy and of trying to monopolize the Afghan movement.

The standoff ended only in 2020, when RFIVA was finally liquidated. By that time, the economic situation in the country had changed, the privileges had been abolished, and many participants in the events of the 1990s had already passed away.

Legalization and transformation

By the mid-to-late 1990s, many representatives of the Afghan movement, including those tied to organized crime, began a process of legalization. The funds they had accumulated were invested in legal business:

• Security companies
• Construction companies
• Retail chains
• Real estate

Former enforcers of criminal groups became respectable businessmen, built mansions in prestigious settlements (such as Perkhushkovo, Zagoryanka), and opened charitable foundations, now for genuine help to veterans. They tried to forget their criminal past or present it as "youthful mistakes."

The line from the novel about "a commander whose daughter had to be cut in" reflects a real practice of the time: marriages of convenience with the daughters of influential people (including military commanders) were a way of securing patronage and protection, as well as access to resources and connections.

The 21st Independent Special-Purpose Brigade, Order of Zhukov

Formation and the start of its combat path

The 21st Independent Special-Purpose Brigade (21 OBrON, military unit 3641) is a special tactical formation stationed in the urban-type settlement of Sofrino in Moscow Region. It is one of the best-known and most combat-capable units, originally part of the USSR Interior Ministry's Internal Troops, and since 2016 part of the National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation.

The formation was created by decision of the USSR Government in response to rising tension in the country's regions in the late 1980s. The brigade was formed on October 10, 1988, by order of the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs, forming a special-purpose brigade on the basis of the 504th training regiment of the USSR MVD Internal Troops near Moscow. On December 27, 1988, the first soldiers took the oath.

Combat history

The brigade's combat history began on February 12, 1989, when its soldiers were deployed to Baku. From 1989 to 1991, 50 operations were carried out in various regions of the disintegrating USSR:

• The events in Tbilisi
• The conflict in the Fergana Valley
• Nagorno-Karabakh
• Dushanbe
• Vilnius (late 1980s – early 1990s)

The first to die were Lieutenant Oleg Babak and Private Maksimov. Since then, April 7 has become a day of remembrance for all who died serving in the 21st Special-Purpose Brigade.

In 1993, the brigade found itself at the center of the political crisis. When the country's leadership issued an order to suppress the Supreme Soviet, the brigade refused to carry it out. This refusal showed that even elite units did not want to take part in fratricidal conflict.

The Chechen campaigns

During the First Chechen War (1994-1996), the brigade actively took part in combat operations. 21 OBrON conducted operations in the Staropromyslovsky district of Grozny, in Argun, Gudermes, and took part in the storming of the settlements of Samashki, Bamut, Achkhoy-Martan, and Orekhovo.

A particularly tragic episode was the mass killing at Samashki in April 1995, which sparked heated debate in the State Duma. According to various estimates, between 100 and 300 civilians died as a result of the storming of the village. This event became one of the darkest stains on the history of the First Chechen War.

In 1997-1998, the 21st Independent Special-Purpose Brigade was stationed in Dagestan. From September 29, 1999, the brigade began taking part in the Second Chechen War. The brigade's route passed through Terekli-Mekteb – Kumli – Chervlennaya.

From December 25, 1999, the unit's soldiers, as part of the federal forces grouping, stormed the city of Grozny. This was one of the bloodiest periods in the brigade's history. In the fighting from December 25, 1999, to January 3, 2000, 33 soldiers were lost. On March 11, 2003, the 21st Brigade left Grozny.

The brigade's significance for the Afghan movement

The 21st Brigade held special significance in the context of the Afghan movement and the events of the 1990s, for several reasons:

1. Personnel base: Many of the brigade's officers and warrant officers were Afghan War veterans. They brought combat experience and OKSVA traditions to the new unit.
2. Geography: Being stationed in Sofrino (Moscow Region) made the brigade a convenient recruiting ground for soldiers from among Afghan veterans living in the capital region.
3. Connections: The brigade's commanders had extensive connections within the Afghan movement. The novel's mention of "a commander who had to be shown respect" reflects a real practice: high-ranking security-service officers often became patrons of veterans' and commercial organizations.
4. Protection: Ties to active-duty military personnel from an elite unit provided Afghan veterans' charitable foundations and commercial structures with reliable "roof" protection from competitors.

In the early 1990s, proximity to Sofrino and ties to the 21st Brigade were something of a mark of quality and protection for a business. The novel's mention of a house in Zagoryanka (located not far from Sofrino – "half an hour from Sofrino to Zagoryanka") is no accident: this was territory under the influence of people connected to the brigade.

Awards and the present day

On May 25, 2016, by decree of the President of the Russian Federation, the 21st Independent Special-Purpose Brigade was awarded the Order of Zhukov for the courage and heroism displayed by its personnel in carrying out service and combat missions. Since then the brigade has borne the official name: the 21st Independent Special-Purpose Brigade, Order of Zhukov.

Today the brigade continues to carry out service and combat missions as part of the National Guard, taking part in counter-terrorism operations and maintaining law and order in various regions of Russia.

Results and consequences

The history of the interaction between the Afghan veterans' movement, organized crime, and the security services in the 1990s is a complex and contradictory page of Russian history. On one hand, veterans genuinely needed help and created organizations for mutual support. On the other, amid the collapse of the state and the legal system, part of these organizations became criminalized and were used to extract profit.

By the late 1990s – early 2000s, the situation began to change. The state strengthened its control over charitable organizations, abolished most of the privileges, and tightened customs legislation. The Russian Union of Afghan Veterans continued its work as a legitimate public organization, focusing on the patriotic education of young people, aid to veterans, and commemorating the memory of the fallen.

Many Afghan veterans who had passed through the criminal world of the 1990s managed to go legitimate and become successful entrepreneurs. Others remained in the shadows. Still others were killed in gang showdowns or ended up in prison.

On February 14, 2023, the Russian Union of Afghan Veterans was re-registered under a new name: the All-Russian Public Organization "Russian Union of Veterans of Afghanistan and Special Military Operations." This symbolizes the continuation of traditions and the succession of generations – from the Afghan veterans to participants in today's military conflicts.

Today the RSVA numbers around 500,000 members and has registered branches in 83 constituent entities of the Russian Federation. The organization is a member of the World Veterans Federation (WVF), which unites representatives of 86 countries. The organization's leader is State Duma deputy Frants Adamovich Klintsevich, and the chairman of the Central Board is Alexander Nikolaevich Razumov.

The history of the Afghan veterans' movement shows how, amid social crisis, even noble ideas of mutual aid can be exploited for criminal ends. But it also demonstrates society's capacity for self-purification and a return to the original ideals of serving the Motherland and helping those in need.